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in scope. Here is a practical objection which might be removed by
the adoption of a uniform act.
It is submitted, therefore, that the statutes relating to jurisdiction
over nonresidents should undergo study and revision by a national
committee; that the revised statutes should employ the doing of an
act theory as one of the bases upon which nonresidents are to be subjected to the jurisdiction of courts at the locus of the wrong, for the
reasons previously pointed out; and, finally, that such a model
statutory section, thus compiled, should be presented in the form of a
uniform act" for adoption by all the states.
HOWARD E. TRENT, JR.
INTERPRETATION OF KENTUCKY STATUTES CONCERNING
DIVISION FENCES
At common law there was no duty upon the landowner to erect
and maintain fences between himself and his neighbor. Each
owner was bound at his peril to keep his cattle upon his own lands
whether the lands of his neighbors were fenced or unfenced.' However where an owner of land and his grantors have for more than
twenty years maintained a specific portion of a partition fence a
spurious kind of easement may arise by prescription.? The easement seems to be founded upon the duty which at common law
required the owner of a close at his peril to keep his cattle thereon,
and to prevent them from trespassing on an adjoining close; and
when the owner of the latter erected a fence for his protection, and
maintained it for the prescriptive period, he was deemed to have
discharged his neighbor from his original duty, and to have become
bound to protect his own close.?
In Kentucky the matter of division fences, their construction
and maintenance is governed by statute. Section 1784 of the Kentucky Statutes applies to improved lands and provides:
"When a division fence is desirable, or is made necessary by
the division of improved or enclosed lands, or no fence or division
fence exists between the improved or enclosed lands of adjoining
owners . . . either party may after he has built a lawful fence
upon his portion of the line require the other to erect a lawful
fence . . . upon his portion of the line . . . and if he fails
to do so, after three months notice, in writing, may erect such
fence, and the cost of erecting such fence shall constitute a lien,
superior to all others, upon the land of the recusant in favor of
the party erecting such fence, and shall be enforced as other
liens."'
" For an interesting discussion of uniform acts and their desirability, see Williston, Life and Law (1940) 217-219.
'Harper, Torts (1933) sec. 166.
2 Carter v. Riegel, 54 N. J. L. 498, 24 Atl. 484
(1892).
'Carter v. Riegel, 54 N. J. L. 498, 24 AUt. 484 (1892); see note 68
Am. Dec. 626 at 628 (1885).
'Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (Baldwin, 1936) sec. 1784.
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Section 1786 is limited in application to unimproved lands, and
provides:
"No one shall be compelled to contribute to the erection of a
partition fence unless he desires to have his land enclosed; but
whenever the owner of unenclosed lands desires to enclose them
he shall not be permitted to unite his outside boundary fences
to the fences of anyone else, unless he pays to the owner of such
fences the fair value of one-half of all fences that would thus
become partition or division fences, and consent, in writing to
thereafter upkeep and maintain one-half of same. Neither party
shall remove same without the consent of the other except between the first of December and the first of March of the ensuing
year!
These two sections appear to be inconsistent since a party under
the authority of Section 1786 could defeat the operation of Section
1784 by simply stating that he did not desire to have his lands
enclosed. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Sturgill v. Sturgifl'
reconciled these sections by finding:
"Section 1784 clearly applies only to improved or enclosed
lands (that is, land suitable for cultivation as distinguished from
unimproved or "wild" lands) while Section 1786, except in the
last clause at least, can apply only to the reverse, (that is, unimproved, or "wild" lands), if the two sections are to be preserved
and harmonized; otherwise they are antagonistic and reduce the
whole law to a nullity. 17
Thus harmonized and reconciled both statutes have an operative and
an effective meaning so that the permanent fencing of improved
lands is the paramount objective of the entire act. But it will be
noted that the dicta of the Sturgill case was doubtful of the application of the last clause of Section 1786 to unimproved lands alone.
Quite possibly this is due to the interpretation given that clause by
the Court of Appeals in Clemmons v. Grow.
The language is comprehensive enough to embrace
any one of the partition fences to which we have referred (inclosing unimproved or improved lands). It can not be said that it
refers alone to the partition fence for which, in part the owner
of unimproved lands is required to pay when he desires to inclose
them by uniting his outside boundary fence to the fence of
another, by the doing of which his unenclosed lands would thereby become inclosed.""
If this interpretation is followed, the law again reverts to a hopeless confusion. Suppose that A and B are adjoining owners. A line
fence exists between their two closes. In May, A and B quarrel and
A, to spite B gives him notice that under the authority of Section 1786
he will remove his portion of the line fence in January of the following year. After A has removed his portion of the fence, B gives him
'Carroll's Kentucky Statutes (Baldwin, 1936) sec. 1786.
'Sturgill v. Sturgill, 180 Ky. 170, 202 S. W. 311 (1918).
Sturgill v. Sturgill, 180 Ky. 170, 202 S.W. 311, 313 (1918).
Clemmons v. Grow, 102 Ky. 499, 43 S.W. 728, 729 (1897).
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notice to build that portion of the fence under Section 1784. Upon
A's failure to so build the fence, B builds it for him and enforces
the lien against A's land as provided for in Section 1784. A again
proceeds under Section 1786 to remove this fence, and B, by the
authority of Section 1784 rebuilds it for him and enforces his lien.
Such a conflict of statutes was obviously not the intention of the
legislature, and yet in Clemmons v. Grow' the court recognized that
such a situation was possible under its interpretation.
The purpose of the legislature according to the Sturgifl case is to
be found in Section 1784,0 of the fencing act providing for the fencing of improved lands, that is lands suitable for cultivation. If this
be the purpose of the act, then the last clause of Section 1786 as interpreted by the Ciemmons case defeats that purpose. These two sections must be reexamined in order to reconcile them in that particular.
There can be no doubt as to the meaning of Section 1784. The
language used in that section is clear and is without conflict. Consider, then, the language of Section 1786. After discussing the construction and the maintenance of a division fence inclosing unimand consent
proved or "wild" lands the first sentence ends, ". ....
in writing, to thereafter upkeep and maintain one-half of same."
It is clear that the adjective "same" is being used substantively.u
Its clear meaning is derived from its antecedent which is in this case
a division fence in unimproved lands. The second sentence begins,
"neither party shall remove same. . ." Here again "same" is being
used substantively as the object of the verb "shall remove." Its antecedent is the subject just referred to which is in this case a division
fence in unimproved lands. The meaning of the word which is "not
differing in kind," "indistinguishably alike," as well as its use in this
particular instance demands that it be used to refer to a division fence
inclosing unimproved lands, and contrary to the court in the
Clemmons case, the language is not comprehensive enough to embrace
any partition fence mentioned in the act. "Same" substantively
refers to the noun just mentioned. The antecedent of "same" particularly limits that sentence to division fences of unimproved lands.
It seems that the court in the Clemmons case was concerned by
the fact that when unimproved lands became fenced they thereby
'Ibid.
" Sturgill v. Sturgill, 180 Ky. 170, 202 S. W. 311, 313 (1918):
that section (1784) expresses the main purpose of the
S..but
whole act (i.e., to permit one adjoining landowner to require the other
to join in the erection of a division fence under two states of cases:
first, where such a fence is desirable or . . . made necessary by
the division of "improved or enclosed lands;" or second, "When no
fence or division fence exists between such lands."
"Webster's New International Dictionary (1927) 1785, "Same
(a)
. . ." Just mentioned or about to be mentioned.
'Do not think how well the same he spends
Who spends his blood his country to relieve.'
Same is commonly preceded by "the, this, or that, "and is often used
substantively as in the citation above."
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became inclosed lands and would thereafter be subject to the requirements of Statute 1784.
It is true that by fencing these lands they
become inclosed but that does not mean that their essential characteristics will be changed. If they are "wild" lands unsuitable for cultivation before they are fenced they remain so after they are inclosed
and their classification as unimproved lands is not made more difficult by the fact that they are fenced.
It has been necessary for the legislature to provide for the
removal of fences in "wild" lands because in this state there are great
tracts of such land which it is neither desirable nor practicable to
fence permanently, although a temporary fence might be expedient
to serve a particular purpose. But when that purpose is passed the
maintenance of such a fence would constitute an unreasonable burden
on the land. It was to take care of this situation that the legislature
enacted 1786 so as to provide a means by which an owner of unimproved lands might fence temporarily such lands and not be forced
to maintain such a fence for an indefinite period of time when it
served no beneficial purpose to him.
The intent and the purpose of the legislature as declared by the
court in the Sturgill case is destroyed and the law pertaining to division fences in Kentucky is reduced to a hopeless confusion if the
interpretation of Clemmrons v. Grow of Section 1786 is followed.
Both the spirit and the latter of the law shows that such an interpretation of the act is wrong and leads to an absurdity. Therefore the
illogical reasoning of Clemmons v. Grow should be rejected, and as in
the Sturgill case the two sections should be harmonized and reconciled so as to leave both statutes operative and at the same time give
effect to the general purpose of the act.
HARRY W.

ROBERTS, JR.

u Clemmons v. Grow, 102 Ky. 499, 43 S. W. 728, 729 (1897).

